Background We previously reported frequent transient positive urea breath tests for Helicobacter pylori infection in a cohort study of young children, and interpreted this as evidence of frequent spontaneous clearance of this infection. In a commentary, Perry and Parsonnet suggested that all transient positive tests we observed could be false positives and thus the appearance of transient infection could be an artifact.
The most striking result from our reported analysis was the large number of subjects who were observed to be positive on one test and negative on a subsequent test. Indeed, most of the infections we observed appeared to be transient (58 of the 72 subjects who tested positive and had a later test subsequently tested negative). This suggests there is a substantial rate of spontaneous clearance in this population, contrary to the frequently repeated prevailing belief that H. pylori infection, once acquired, persists in the absence of treatment (a belief which is unsubstantiated, given that H. pylori infection is not generally detectable at onset, so the proportion of naturally acquired infections that persist is not known). We suspect this belief is based on the studies of prevalent, and in most reports, clinicallysignificant, H. pylori infection in adults that dominate the literature; when such infections are followed, clearance is rare in the absence of treatment. But longitudinal observation of prevalent infection in adults provides little evidence of natural history in early childhood, or even acute infection in adulthood, thus the frequency of self-resolving H. pylori infections of short duration remains uncertain.
In a commentary following our article, 4 Perry and Parsonnet (P&P) presented an example that purported to illustrate that the observations of spontaneous clearance could all be due to measurement error, particularly false positives. As noted in our paper, 1 data on UBT accuracy in young children is scarce and some authors allege reduced specificity at young ages, 5, 6 though not all evidence supports this claim. [7] [8] [9] [10] With their example, P&P implicitly argue the important point that possible study errors should be assessed quantitatively, a point one of us has emphasized in previous work.
11 -13 Indeed, we planned to quantify and report the uncertainty in our findings that result from measurement error after additional results from our data were published, and should have emphasized this intention in the previous report. We commend P&P's effort to quantify errors other than those arising from random sampling and to call attention to an inferential problem in the Pasitos Cohort data. But it is important to not confuse the ability to make up a scenario that could roughly (though incompletely as shown below) explain an observation with a valid argument that an alternate explanation is less likely. P&P's presentation left some readers believing that the existence of their scenario, in which apparent spontaneous clearance was an artifact of measurement error, should substantially weaken the belief that we have observed spontaneous clearance in the Pasitos Cohort. Indeed, we have heard from readers who assert that this scenario invalidates the claim that we observed evidence of spontaneous clearance. For this reason, and to try to improve the understanding of how to interpret evidence, we felt it was important to go beyond imagining possible alternative explanations and instead address the question of how likely it is that plausible levels of measurement error explain all (or even most) of the spontaneous clearance we observed. The present paper has two aims. First, we highlight important limitations of P&P's approach to the assessment of potential bias. Secondly, and of more general interest, we analyse the epistemic value of our data in the face of competing hypotheses using a simple Bayesian method. A more complete analysis of the value of our data given plausible levels of measurement error is beyond the present scope and will be presented separately.
Assessment of P&P's analysis
P&P proposed a hypothetical scenario where 468 subjects were observed at each of four periods, exactly 47 subjects were truly infected at all periods and no individuals changed true infection status during the study period (this is inadequately described in their methods as 'true prevalence of infection of 10%' but details can be inferred from their presentation), and measurement error is described as sensitivity ¼ specificity ¼ 0.95. Their scenario duplicated the 125 acquisitions and roughly approximated the clearances (66 compared with our 58) we observed within the 24-month period.
[Two minor problems require clarification: (i) P&P compare the 125 with our reported 128 acquisitions, which includes three acquisitions in children who missed the fourth visit and were interpolated as occurring in the second year; dealing with missing visits is problematic (see below), but it seems that the correct number of acquisitions for this comparison are those detected from 0 to 24 months; (ii) in our abstract we misreported the clearance frequency as 77%, which P&P apparently converted to a count of 65 for reasons that are unclear. As shown in our tabular data, there were 58 observed clearances among 72 potential clearances (80.5%). Thus, one of P&P's numbers matches our observation better than what they posited, while the other matches considerably less well.]
An obvious simple observation is that since most infections observed in our study were transient, for false positives to explain our result, the study population must have had very few infections, despite having demographics that would lead us to expect a high rate. If there were no transient positives then there were few true positives. The only other possible explanation would be that the infections were not transient, but there was an extremely high false negative rate (approaching 0.5) that made them appear transient. (The latter explanation also assumes no substantial serial correlation in errors-i.e. that causes of mismeasurement do not persist across time within subjects; an unwarranted assumption, as P&P note.)
Understanding why the scenario presented by P&P does not diminish the evidence in our data of spontaneous clearance requires a clear statement of the reasoning that might lead readers to conclude that it does. P&P do not explicitly argue that their scenario diminishes the credibility of our conclusion, and as such do not outline such an argument. Readers of their paper have disagreed about whether it contains an implicit claim about our conclusion or merely draws attention to the inferential ambiguity; we know, however, that some readers have interpreted their presentation as invalidating our conclusion about evidence of spontaneous clearance. Anyone finding such an argument in their presentation must be implicitly invoking the following logic:
( Once the necessary argument that would lead from the P&P scenario to doubt about spontaneous clearance is made explicit, its flaws become apparent. We will show that 5 is illogical, 4 is false and 3 is doubtful; moreover, the P&P scenario does not actually conform to the posited parameters (i.e. even 2 is false), and the actual scenario P&P's numbers represent is even less plausible than the one they describe in their prose.
An existence proof is not informative
The logic implicit in point 5 starts with the observation that a particular pattern of measurement error could cause a particular set of true values to generate particular observed data. But such an existence proof is not, in itself, informative. It is trivial to show that for any true values and any possible dataset, particular measurement errors would generate the latter from the former. Indeed, assuming non-zero probability of any particular mismeasurement (almost always a reasonable assumption), for any true underlying values there is always positive probability of generating any hypothetical dataset. This point, however, seems to be widely misunderstood in health science. Commonly encountered statements like 'measurement error could explain the observed results' (or, worse, claims that it could not explain it) suggest that many researchers do not realize that measurement error could always explain observed results.
Since simply showing that some scenario produces particular data is uninformative, the usefulness of such an exercise depends on the plausibility of competing scenarios. For example, one might generate a study bias scenario that is likely to produce particular observed results from a particular posited underlying reality, and then consider whether it is plausible (a process that has been labelled 'targetadjustment sensitivity analysis' 13 ). Alternately, one might posit a plausible bias scenario and generate the true underlying reality that is likely to have produced the observed results (labelled 'bias-level sensitivity analysis' 13 ). P&P do not make clear whether they calculated the necessary measurement error to target the acquisition and clearance rates or calculated the acquisition and clearance rates after positing measurement errors. The former seems more likely, but in any case, they do not address the plausibility of the scenario. Sensitivity analysis is valuable, but-like all other aspects of scientific inquiry-it must be filtered through beliefs about what is plausible. While the existence proof might appeal to those who seek the illusion of objectivity in scientific inquiry, a proof that something that is always true is true in a particular case is not informative.
Sensitivity and specificity are not deterministic Though not fatal to the logic we lay out above, this is an error in P&P's methodology that should be noted. A common misconception in analyses based on estimates of sensitivity and specificity is that they represent deterministic measures of how many subjects will be mismeasured, rather than propensities or expected values. The actual realization for each measurement will be either correct or incorrect, with probability independent of all other realizations. (It is possible to make assumptions other than complete independence, but this requires a departure from modelling the errors as just sensitivity and specificity.)
Instead of basing their scenario on sensitivity and specificity, as they state, P&P actually posit a specific pattern of mismeasurement as follows: at each period, for each subpopulation (defined by having the same true status and past measurements), 5% (rounded to the nearest whole number) are mismeasured. This particular realization could result from the two conditions, sensitivity ¼ specificity ¼ 0.95, but it is not equivalent. Indeed, P&P's model replaces the two conditions with 30 separate conditions, one for each subpopulation in each period, which makes it much more difficult to defend as plausible. Of course, since P&P are primarily providing an existence proof, their positing that measurement error follows a particular deterministic pattern neither improves upon nor detracts from that proof. Correctly calculating results from a scenario based on posited sensitivity and specificity is, however, more complicated than P&P imply, requiring calculation (or numerical approximation) of the probability distribution of possible particular outcomes and reporting that distribution or summary statistics from it.
Incompatible denominators
The P&P scenario, however plausible or implausible, also fails to generate data similar to what we reported (point 4 in the above logic). One reason is that the two statistics they identify as similar to ours, counts of observed acquisitions and clearances, are based on a substantially larger number of observations, so the actual rates of events differ substantially. (We will refer to a first positive test result as an observed acquisition and the first negative test result following a positive as an observed clearance.)
P&P compare a scenario with (almost) complete follow-up (four observations for each of the 468 subjects) to our actual data, in which 688 of the targeted 1872 observations are missing. As is typical in cohort studies, our targeted follow-up was incomplete. Our Table 6 reported the exact pattern of negative, positive and missing results for every subject. (P&P actually have a bit of missing data, dropping one individual in the second period. However, this is likely an editing error, rather than an attempt to represent missing data, offering a delightful lesson in the uncertainty in study results: data deviate from the underlying reality-even when 'reality' is a hypothetical scenario and the 'data' are derived by simple arithmetic!) Thus, P&P approximately replicate our event counts based on a substantially larger denominator. The rate of acquisition in the P&P scenario, therefore, is considerably lower than what we observed. Specifically, their scenario has 1611 person-periods at risk for observing acquisition (1872 minus 261 periods after observed acquisition), while in our data, the number of non-lost-to-follow-up person-periods at risk is, at most, 1269.
[The 'at most' is because it is tricky to classify the at-risk intervals for real cohort data and a disease that sometimes clears. Where we have a missing observation and subsequent data it is not clear whether to count the missing period in the denominator. Consider the pattern, negative-missing-negativenegative. To count the missing period as not at risk, calling this three at-risk periods, undercounts because someone who was never infected (no infection in four at-risk periods) would show this pattern. However, counting four at-risk periods overcounts because someone who became infected in the second period and cleared in the third period would show this pattern. The 1269 count uses the latter definition, counting every period for which there is a subsequent observation. If we omit all missing observations as not contributing at-risk person-time, we have 1068.] P&P report of their scenario that 'the cumulative first time infection rate would appear to be 27%, which is approximately what Goodman et al. observed . . .' (p. 1356). What they actually generated was a risk (incidence proportion) for the four periods of 27%; their incidence rate (events/person-time) is lower than ours by more than one-fifth due to the difference in at-risk person-periods.
Similarly, the P&P scenario includes 193 personperiods at risk of clearance (acquisition observed, but
clearance not yet observed), compared with our 87 (based on the method that gets 1269 above). The difference is driven both by missing data (we lost 51 periods of potential at-risk-of-clearance person-time because of censoring) and because our observed infections are, on average, more transient than those in the P&P model, so we could only have 138 at-risk periods even without missing data. Recall that true positives in the P&P scenario persist across all periods, so those testing positive were likely to continue to test positive, and thus have several periods at risk of clearance. When P&P report observing 'a cumulative reversion rate of $61% (versus Goodman's report of 77%)', which is only moderately close, they are reporting a clearance proportion, or risk of clearance, and again ignoring person-time. Their scenario produced 66 clearances among 107 possible (actually 62%, by our calculation), while our Table 6 shows 72 acquisitions for subjects who had any subsequent non-missing data (and thus any chance for observed clearance), of which 58 (81%, rather than the 77% we reported in the abstract-we are equal-opportunity observers of arithmetic goofs) were observed clearances. These proportions may be viewed as similar, but the rate of clearance in the P&P scenario is much lower than ours-well under half-because of their much larger denominator.
Other discrepancies between the scenario results and our data Beyond the P&P scenario not replicating our rates of acquisition and clearance, other substantial deviations make it difficult to argue that their scenario could explain our data. For example, our data show a fairly similar number of observed acquisitions across periods 30, 46, 26, 26), which would be expected from a roughly constant rate of acquisition. The P&P scenario has the quite different pattern of 66, 22, 19, 18 (which results from 45 of the true positives being correctly observed in the first period and the other two in the second, along with a fairly constant number of false positives). Additional discrepancies are easily observed, further challenging the interpretation that the scenario presents a compelling alternative explanation for the observed data.
Plausibility of the scenario
Finally, we will note that the P&P scenario does not seem a likely description of reality. If the scenario actually produced data similar to ours, we would want to ask, 'is it plausible?' If not, it does not provide an informative sensitivity analysis and should not be interpreted as affecting the plausibility of our conclusions.
For example, the assumption of all true acquisition occurring in the first 6 months is not realistic given what is known about H. pylori transmission and childhood infection in general. We presume this unrealistic assumption was made to simplify calculations, based on the belief that the existence proof was useful, however implausible. But the proof does not demonstrate how likely the competing hypothesis is and the unrealistic assumption renders the scenario an implausible alternate explanation for what was observed.
A simple calculation of how our data should affect beliefs
The analysis presented by P&P implicitly raises the legitimate question of whether the Goodman et al. (Bayesian analysis seeks the probability, as defined by beliefs, that certain worldly phenomena are true; this contrasts with conventional frequentist statistics, which can only generate predictions about hypothetical repeated samples based on a posited reality.) The following simple calculation shows updating of beliefs based on data and leaves little doubt about the answer.
For ease of exposition, assume our prior beliefs are that the spontaneous clearance rate (per period) is either zero or it takes on one of the values (0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.7), and that sensitivity equals specificity and they take on one of the values (1.0, 0.99, . . . , 0.91). Obviously these variables really take continuous values, but letting discrete values stand in for the range of values near them is a close approximation and allows for easier presentation. In addition, the simplification should demonstrate to interested readers that an approach like this is not extremely complicated, does not require sophisticated programming (we did it in a spreadsheet), and can be done by anyone educated in epidemiologic methods. There is no reason to assume that sensitivity ¼ specificity, but within the plausible range sensitivity has little impact and is not worth the substantial increase in complexity that comes with moving beyond two dimensions of information to display; choosing to just fix the sensitivity at, say, 0.95 would have produced almost identical results.
For each subject for each period in our data, prior probabilities were calculated for true infection status based on: probability of acquisition (described below); posited probability of clearance; previous actual measurements; and posited measurement error variables. From these (the a priori priors for the first period and the calculated updated probabilities for subsequent periods), the probability of the observed data was calculated. Missing observations were treated as deterministic, so contribute a probability of 1, which is equivalent to ignoring them in the calculation. The probabilities of all observations across all subjects were multiplied to get the likelihood of the data given the input parameters. The acquisition probability for each clearance-measurement error combination was chosen to maximize this likelihood [calculated using Microsoft Excel 2003's 'Solver' utility, with default settings and bounds (which proved non-binding)]. This resulted in 80 likelihoods, one for each set of input values and the acquisition rate calculated to be most compatible with them ( Table 1 ). The equations that are implicitly defined in this paragraph can be found in the Appendix.
The maximum likelihood among those models is 7 Â 10 -196 , for Sp ¼ 0.92 and a clearance rate of 0.4. For comparison, the likelihood for the P&P scenario (treating measurement error parameters as probabilities-obviously the likelihood for the deterministic version of it is 0) is in the order of 10 À220 . Relaxing their scenario by solving for the rate of acquisition that maximizes the likelihood yields 10 À216 (with their assumption of all acquisitions in the first period) or 10 À203 (with a constant rate of acquisition). Thus, the likelihood of the P&P scenario is many orders of magnitude lower than a wide range of models with positive clearance (Table S1) .
A purely frequentist, likelihood-based analysis could stop with these observations, and would seem rather convincing in itself. (We have addressed that purely-frequentist interpretation, as well as a hypothesis-testing-based frequentist analysis in further work. 14 ) But to determine how this information ought to affect our beliefs, we need to complete the Bayesian analysis, starting by specifying prior beliefs about probabilities. To illustrate the main point, imagine that someone believed, before seeing our data, that there was a probability of only 1% for each posited discrete positive clearance rate, summing to a 7% probability of any frequency of true clearance, leaving a very strong belief that there is no clearance ( Table 2 ). To this we add a prior probability distribution for levels of measurement error, which we posit would be unimodal and follow the pattern in Table S2 . The two sets of priors are independent, which seems a reasonable assumption.
The resulting posterior probabilities, calculated from the priors in Table S2 , the likelihoods from our data in Table S1 , and application of Bayes's formula, appear in Table 3 . The key result is that even starting with a prior as strong as 93% for the probability of no clearance, the posterior probability for that claim is <30%, with $60% probability that the true per-period For each secenario the posterior probability appears in the table. The resulting marginal probabilities (row and column sums) appear in the last row and column. For each rate of clearance and measurement accuracy, the hypothesized prior probabilities appear in the last column and row, respectively. The resulting products, the priors for each scenario, appear in the table.
clearance rate is 50.4. Naturally, the exact posterior probabilities are sensitive to the inputs (and interested readers can do alternate calculations based on the data we reported). But the details matter little for the conclusion that our data should cause anyone with reasonable priors to believe that spontaneous clearance is quite probable after taking measurement error into account. Obviously, a prior probability of no spontaneous clearance of exactly 100% is unaffected by data. But such a dogmatic prior is doctrine, not science.
With this analysis, we can also ask what levels of measurement error are most compatible with our data if we posit that there is no spontaneous clearance. The maximum likelihoods for zero spontaneous clearance are reached for values of specificity $0.90, with likelihood for Sp ¼ Se ¼ 0.90 of 3 Â 10 -196 . If we relax the assumption Sp ¼ Se, the likelihood increases a bit with substantially lower sensitivity. There is a fairly wide plateau, with specificity in the range of 0.90-0.92 and sensitivity of 40.8 with likelihood in the order of 10 À195 . Of course, the greater likelihood does not mean that this is a more probable set of underlying true values than those assessed abovesuch a conclusion would depend on prior beliefs that those levels of error are plausible, and the existing literature does not support such low levels of measurement accuracy. Moreover, those models are based on acquisition rates much lower than observed, down in the range of 2% per period (increasing to double or triple that only as sensitivity drops close to 0.5).
This brings us back to the simple observation we began with: if our data do not reflect spontaneous clearance, we must be seeing a combination of a high false positive rate and a very low infection rate and/or a very high false negative rate. External knowledge about the likely infection rate and measurement accuracy, along with our calculations, show that one's prior belief about lack of clearance would have to be very close to doctrine to favour the interpretation that the clearance observed in the Pasitos Cohort was an artifact of measurement error.
Conclusions
We wrote this response for two reasons. First, we have heard from readers who believe that P&P's hypothetical example shows that Pasitos Cohort data does not provide evidence of frequent transient infection. The present analysis shows that acknowledging plausible levels of measurement error does not change the strong support our data provide for the conclusion that transient infection occurs commonly in children residing in regions such as the US-Mexico border.
Our second motivation is that we believe strongly in the value of quantifying uncertainty from study errors, and we wanted to present a practical and informative approach to doing so. Some critics of quantifying uncertainty from study errors argue that the effort is pointless because one can just make up any scenario to support any interpretation of the data. Such critiques are validated when an analysis of possible measurement error is merely an exercise in producing a contrived hypothetical scenario with the claim that it could explain the result. Creating a hypothetical bias scenario as an alternate explanation for a study result is a reasonable exercise, but to be useful that scenario must be plausible and consistent with other observations, including other results from the same study.
Other critics of quantifying uncertainty to assess competing conclusions confuse doing so with taking sides in a (mythical) struggle between Bayesian and frequentist statistics, usually claiming that any recognition of uncertainty represents a denial of frequentist orthodoxy. The present analysis should make clear that approaches to quantifying uncertainty need not invoke conflicts in statistical paradigms. The P&P analysis includes neither frequentist nor Bayesian statistics, while our response shows that an analysis from either perspective makes our point. Those who understand the role of statistics in worldly inference will, of course, anticipate this since each statistical paradigm is designed to represent the same underlying reality, and so when used correctly they will lead to generally the same conclusion.
Analysis in the health sciences suffers from a tendency to declare a supported hypothesis to be 'True' up until the point where some other analysis 'Proves' it to be 'False'. But empirical science provides no truths, proofs, or falsehoods, and thus inference requires more cognitive work than it usually receives. Existing scientific knowledge and statistical tools can be used to estimate which among competing explanations is most likely in the face of observed data.
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The likelihood function L is the product of the likelihood functions for each individual, i:
These in turn are the products of the likelihoods for i for the four periods of observation,
The likelihoods, L it , are the probability of observing the particular recorded infection status, X it , given the prior (before observing period t data) probability that individual i is truly positive for infection, P it , as follows:
Those prior probabilities are functions of the previous periods' data and other parameters as follows:
where the Post it is the posterior (after observing period t data) probability that individual i is truly positive for infection in period t, which is calculated as follows:
Post it ¼ P it Se P it Se þ ð1 À P it Þð1 À SpÞ if X it ¼ positive P it ð1 À SeÞ P it ð1 À SeÞ þ ð1 À P it ÞSp if X it ¼ negative P it if X it is missing
KEY MESSAGES
Our previous conclusion that we observed spontaneous clearance of Helicobacter pylori infection in young children is robust to reasonable levels of measurement error. Quantification of possible error in epidemiologic studies is a valuable exercise if done in a useful way; simply showing a contrived alternate explanation is not useful. Alternate explanations for observations should be quantitatively analysed to compare their relative plausibility. Both frequentist and Bayesian methods for analyzing the plausibility of an error scenario can be relatively easy to carry out, and will produce basically the same conclusions.
